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NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-Concealed Weapons-Revolver as a
pistol within the statute prohibiting carrying a pistol concealedConstruction of statute prohibiting carrying concealed weapons.
Samuel Schraeder was indicted. for carrying a concealed
weapon, and-upon conviction appealed. Schraeder v. State, 162
N. E. (Ohio) 647 (1928).
The accused, who was transporting whiskey in an automobile upon approach of the car of a sheriff, who was pursuing him,
was seen to throw a..32-.20 Colt revolver, loaded with cartridges,
into the weeds alongside the road. After being captured, the
accused was indicted for carrying a concealed weapon, in violation of Sec. 12819 of the General Code, which provides that:
"Whoever carries a pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or other dangerous
weapon concealed on or about his person, shall be fined-or imprisoned-". The indictment did not allege that the revolver was
loaded with powder and ball, and counsel for the accused contended that a revolver is not a pistol, within the terms of the
statute, and that the indictment must allege that the revolver was
loaded with powder and ball, in order to constitute it a dangerous
weapon within the meaning of the statute.
rn passing upon this contention, the Court relied upon the
definition of a revolver as found in Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary, to the effect that a revolver is "a firearm, especially a
pistol--", and held that it was therefore unnecessary, in a prosecution for a violation of Sec. 12819 of the General Code, for the
State to allege in the indictment that the revolver was loaded with
powder and ball.
When asked about the revolver, the accused stated that he
had it in a pocket attached to the left front door of his automobile; counsel for the accused raised the question whether a revolver kept in such a place was one concealed on or about the
"person of the accused, within the meaning of the statute.
The Court, in deciding this question, said: "There are certain fundamental rules of statutory construction which are very
helpful in the solution of the problem here. In substance, they
are that words in a statute should be construed as they are gen-
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erally understood, and that effect must, if possible, be given to
each and every word of an act. (Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, vol. 2, pp. 731-749). Applying these rules to the
language under consideration, we conclude that our Legislature
did not intend to use the words 'on' and 'about', in the phrase 'on
or about his person', as interchangeable terms. As we see it the
word 'on' in the expression 'on or about the person' means connected with or attached to, while the word 'about" means near by,
close at hand, or in reach of. (People v. Iiemoth, 322 Ill. 51;
Welch v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 617).
"We are aware that there are decisions in other jurisdictions
utterly irreconcilable with the holding here. (Cunningham v.
State, 76 Ala. 88; State v. Brunson, 162 La. 902; Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 109. Va. 834). But these decisions are, in turn in conflict with Paulk v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 415; State v. Mulconry,
(Mo. Sup.) 270 S. W. 375; Barton v. State, 66 Tenn. 105; and State
v. McManns, 99 N. C. 555, which are authorities supporting the
pronouncement here.
"In the instant case, the revolver durifig the chase was hidden in the pocket attached to the inside of the left front door of
the automobile, and immediately beside the accused, who was
driving the car, and, in our opinion therefore, was within the purview of Sec. 12819, General Code, concealed about his person."
J. I. Canty
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Legislative power of county
commissioners to levy and collect assessments against the stateMandamus to compel county commissioners to construct sewers
benefitting state property.
The State, on relation of John Monger, Director of Health,
made application for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of
County Commissioners of Fairfield County to construct a system
of sanitary sewers and sewage treatment and disposal works for
the service of territory lying contiguous to Buckeye Lake. State
ex rel Monger, Directorof Health v. Board of Cozanty Commissioners
of Faidleld County. Supreme Court of Ohio, 1928. (162 N. E.
393).
The relator, as Director of Health, served on the Board of
Commissioners an order requiring them to construct the system
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of sewers in controversy. In his petition for mandamus to compel compliance with the order, the relator alleged that the Board
had created a sewer district containing territory generally in accord with the territory described in the order, but that the order
had not been complied with, and that the Board refused to comply
with the order.
In sustaining a demurrer interposed by the defendants, on the
grounds that the proposed improvement was in part for the bene.fit of state property, the Court said: "The demurrer to the petition will be sustained and a mandatory writ denied upon the
ground that the present use of the state property, known as Buckeye Lake, is proprietary, and, the proposed improvement being
in part for the benefit of such state property, the imposing of an
assessment for the entire expense of such improviement upon a
district less than the state would, under the provisions of chapter
4, title III, part second of the General Code, amount to an imposition on such district of a burden that belongs in part to, and
ought to be borne in part by, the state at large."
But, after holding that a portion of the burden of making improvements on state property belonged to the state at large, the
Court further held that this burden could not be collected from
the state by means of an assessment against the state by a board
of county commissioners. In the words of the Court: "The
amount which ought to be borne in part by the state at large cannot be apportioned to and collected from the state under sec.
6602-33c, for the reason that the Legislature is without power to
delegate to a board of county commissioners the legislative power
to levy and collect an assessment against the state." Because of
this lack of legislative power on the part of the Board of Commissioners to compel the state to contribute its rightful share of the
burden, it was held that a writ of mandamus could not be granted
to compel the Board to make the improvements. To grant the
writ would have the effect either of placing upon a particular district a burden greater than could rightfully be imposed upon it,
or of compelling the Board to exercise a power which it did not
lawfully possess.
J. J. Canty
AUTOMOBILES-The Negligence of the Passenger. With
the introduction of automobiles the question has arisen for deci-
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sion whether or not a passenger while riding in an automobile
must be alert to discover dangers or be guilty of negligence as a
matter of law.
In the case of Schlosstein %,.Bernstein 142 A. 324 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania answered this question in the negative. Plaintiff while riding in the car of one Emmett Th9mas
sustained painful injuries for which this action was brought.
Defendant contends that the negligence of the passenger in not
observing his approaching car must be deemed as negligence
per se. The Court stated that passengers in automobiles will not
be held guilty of negligence as a matter of law for failing to discover perils, quoting Justice Frazer:
"The tendency of our decisions is to hold a passenger responsible for his actual negligence in joining with the driver in
testing a danger he knows exists and not for result of merge inaction in failing to discover dangers of which he is ignorant but
might have discovered, had he been giving attention to the roadway ahead of him."
The Court of Pennsylvania has established a correct precedent, which will in probability be followed by other jurisdictions when confronted with a similar situation.
Anthony I. DeDario
BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-Infancy of promisor-Objections not in time. The case of Corbin v;. Gomes 142A.
328 was an action in assumpsit for breach of promise to marry.
Defendant pleaded the general issue, but was permitted without
objection to prove his minority. On conclusion of the testimony
defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that at the
time promise was made defendant was under twenty one years of
age. Plaintiff urged that motion should not be granted because
no plea of infancy had been filed and that proof of infancy was
inadmissible under plea of general issue.
The court held that infancy of the promisor was a complete
defense to the action and that the failure to object to the evidence
at the time it is offered is a waiver of objection that it is not admissable under pleadings. If evidence offered is not objected to
party presenting it is entitled to benefit of any cause of action or
defense established thereby.
Anthony J. DeDario
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DIVORCE--Willful neglect. This was the case of Hammond v. Hammond, California. It appears in 267 Pac. 893. May
26, 1928.
Action by Bernice N. Hammond against W. D. Hammond.
Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals.
The action was for willful neglect and extr~mie cruelty. No
other evidence on the latter cause.
It was shown that the plaintiff and the defendant had lived
together until ninety days before the suit was brought.
The defendant claimed that he had always supported his wife
and as evidence of this defense he produced many canceled
checks, to show that he had provided her with money for her
support.
The defendant offered as a defense the fact that his wife
worked and that she kept the proceeds of her employment. The
court was not informed as to the amount of her earnings, nor
whether or not the sum was sufficient for her needs. The point
of the case is that-willful neglect is not established, if while living
together, the wife works and is allowed to keep her earnings, so
that she may provide for herself. Judgment affirmed.
John P. Berscheid
MECHANICS LIEN-What constitutes materials under
Mechanics Lien Law. The case of Arata and Peters '. Snow
Mountain Water and Power Company et al, appearing in 367 Pac.
932. (Cal.) May 28, 1928. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff sued the contractor for 'foodstuffs furnished under
a private contract. Plaintiff alleges that he furnished: certain
vegetables to the contractor whc used them in supplying meals
to the men employed in building a dam. Plaintiffs contention
is that the foodstuffs were actually used in connection with the
construction of the dam.
The essential question is whether the action will lie under
Section 1183 Code of Civil procedure which provides for Mechanics Liens. This statute allows a mechanics lien to lie for
materials furnished to contractors in the building of structures,
buildings, etc. The point to be decided is whether or not vegetables come under the heading materials used and consumed.
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There is a well defined distinction between provisions and supplies and materials. Provisions and supplies relate to a stock of
food. Had the legislature meant the act to embrace food supplies, the court held, it would have incorporated the term in the
Sec. 1183 Code of Cival Procedure.
This case is distinguished from the case where the contractor
is under bond to pay for provisions and supplies furnished him.
Judgment affirmed.
John P. Berscheid
NEW TRIAL. In the recent case of Skinner v. Cron, the
Supreme Court of Iowa held, that a Juror's unauthorized visit to
the scene of an automobile collision to ascertain how the collision
occured and whether witnesses could have seen what they.testified they saw, was prejudicial error. The court went on to say
that the purpose of law in permitting the jury to view the premises under order of court and in charge of a sworn officer is to
enable them better to understand testimony of witnesses and
more intelligently to apply such testimony to issues, and not to
make them silent witnesses in the case.
The application for a new trial on the ground of misconduct
of the jury must be made by motion, but it is permissible for
testinmony in support of or against it to be made by affidavit under
Iowa Code 1927, 11231, 11550, 11551, in view of provision that application must be by motion, and, if cause of jurisdiction be misconduct, motion may be sustained and controverted by affidavits.
89 Wis. 38, 112 Me. 289; 102 Minn. 81, 157 Mass. 579.
F. Earl Lambolev
WILLS. In the case of Weber et al v. Weber et al, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that in a will contest case in which
contestants claimed executrix was incompetent to make will,
judgment of circuit court entered in 1926 to the effect that testatrix in 1920 and "for long time prior thereto" was incompetent
to make deed of her property held properly excluded, where will
was executed in 1918, since finding of incompetency in 1920 was
not evidence of incompetency in 1918.
F. Earl Lamboley
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The Supreme Court of Minn.
held recently that in construing an article of the state constitution, the aim is to ascertain the intent of the legislators and people in adopting it. If the language used is unambiguous, .it must
control. The entire enactment is to be considered as a whole.
If open to construction, the social, economic, and political situation of the people at the time of its adoption, and subseqitent
changes therein, may be looked to for any light thereby thrown
on the subject. A practical common sense construction should
be given. (State ex rel Chase v. Babcock, State of Commissioner of
Highways.)
F. Earl Lamboley
CRIMINAL LAW. In the case of State ex rel Preston, Co.
Atty.,.v: Hamilton, Judge, et al, the Supreme court of Iowa held
that only the Governor has the sole authority, power, or right to
remit, reprieve, commute, or pardon after conviction for crime,
under Const. art 4, 16.
On the defendant's conviction for illegal possession of intoxicating liquor, provision in judgment for its suspension during the
defendant's good behavior on condition of payment of costs held
unauthorized and void, since the power to pardon or reprieve is
vested only in the Governor, and attempted suspension of sentence did not constitute arrest of judgment, under Code 1927.
F. Earl Lamboley
WELLS V. HECT & CO.-Court of Appeals of Maryland,
1928. (142 A. 258). This was an action for personal injuries
brought by the plaintiff, a woman riding as passenger in the automobile of one Caleb Griffin. While riding therein, the car collided with a truck operated by "W.E. Miller, an employee of Hect
Bros. & Co. In the lower court, the defendant got judgment on
a motion for a directed verdict which the court granted. This is
an appeal from that judgment.
The appellant (plaintiff in lower court) alleged in her complaint that the accident happened through the alleged negligence
of the defendant's truck driver. The accident occurred after midnight while Miller was returning from a farewell house party at
the home of another employee given for the benefit of a depart-
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ment manager of the company who was leaving the defendant
firm. It was proved at the trial that the employers of the firm
had no knowledge of the use of the truck for said purpose nor any
previous knowledge of the party until after the accident happened.
The appellant failed to prove that Miller, the truck-driver, in
using the truck at such a late hour at the time of the accident, did
so in the course of his employment and as agent for the defendant.
On the other hand, there was ample proof that the truck was used
at the suggestion of the department manager, who ha.d no authority to grant this privilege to Miller.
The only question upon appeal is whether or not the court
erred in granting the defendant's prayer of withdrawing the case
from the jury on a motion for a directed verdict. This presehis
the further question whether or not the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the finding that Miller was not acting as agent of the defendant at the time of the accident. The upper court, in reviewing the case found that the only possible evidence the appellant
could rely upon in her support was an admission made by Miller
to a policeman shortly after the accident occurred to the effect
that he had been out on business f6r the defendant company arid
that he was working overtime. This admission was made in response to the policeman's query demanding to know "whathe was
doing with the truck at such a late hour. But the court held that in
any event this evidence could not be admitted to prove agency.
There must be proof of agency before the admission of an alleged
agent can be offered to bind the principal, DearholtMotor Sales v.
Merrit, 105 A. 316 (Md.); Marchall v. Haney, 59 Am. Dec. 92
(Md.); Tifer v. Clearieldand Cambria,62 A. 1122 (Md.) ; Atwell v.
Miller, 69 Am. Dec. 206 (Md.) ; State v. Benson & Company, 100 A.
505 (Md.).
The Court further held that the rule in the state of Maryland
is that when a vehicle owned by a defendant is.' iti, by one in the
general employment of defendant and an accident 6c.urrs, there
is a prima facie presumption that the operator was acting within
the scope of his employment. But this presumption, being only
prima facie, is overcome by evidence to the contrary introduced
at the trial. Where this evidence is uncontradicted and undisputed, it becomes a question for the*court and in this case, the
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lower court properly took the case away from the jury as the
defendant's testimony was almost undisputed.
J. Angelino
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Power of court to conduct
general inquiry into attorneys' conduct and to compel one of
them to testify as to his professional acts.
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the release of relator
from custody under a committment for contempt in refusing to
testify in.a general investigation made upon order of the Appellate Division, at the request of a bar association, into the conduct
of members of the bar. Relator, a member of the bar, was subpoenaed and appeared at the investigation but refused to be
sworn. He was called to testify as to his conduct in the procurement of retainers in cases involving personal injuries. His refusal to testify was a challenge to the inquiry as a whole and the
court adjudged him in contempt and committed him to jail. His
petition for a release on habeas corpus was dismissed and he appeals. (People ex rel Karlin, v. Culkin, Sheriff. N. Y. 1928. 162
N. E. 487).
The Court of Appeals held that-the Appellate Division may
direct a general inquiry into the conduct of members of the bar
and compel one of them to testify as to his professional acts, subject to, a claim of privilege, if answer would expose him to punishment for crime. The court stated that precedent could be found
for this.power both ih the Judiciary law of the state (Laws 1912.
c. 253,'sec..88.) and in the practice of the English courts since
1567 vhen by order of the Common Pleas a special jury was instructed to inquire into the various abuses wihich were then prevalent in England. The end of this inquiry was to discipline such
attorneys as were found committing the abuses by disbarrment.
, The power of the court in its discipline of its officers is a dual
one. It prefers the charges and determines them. There must
necessarily be a preliminary inquiry before a decision whdther or
not to prosecute can be reached. In these preliminary inquiries
the power of using methods appropriate and adequate'to obtain
the needed information is thus implied from the power of conducting the inquiry. There is therefore the power to investigate
by subpoena under the sanction of an oath.
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That this power of inquiry may not, by its very nature, injure the reputation of the attorney summoned to appear before
it the preliminary steps of the inquiry are held in secret and such
secret inquiry is not a sitting of a court within sec. 4 of the Judiciary law, whereby sittings of courts are requred to be public.
It is a quasi administrative remedy whereby the court is given
information that may move it to other acts thereafter. (Matter
of Richardson, 160 N. E. 655.)
Full protection against publicity was accorded to the relator
in the proceedings but not choosing to avail himself of it, publicity came to him through his refusal to be sworn. Such refusal
was a contempt and the order dismissing the writ is affirmed.
D. Donahue
NEGLIGENCE-Manufacturers of electric sewing machine
held liable to members of buyer's family for negligence in failing
to have article properly insulated.
The plaintiff, Helen Rae Feisel, a minor about the age of one
year by her next friend A. F. Feisel brought this action against
the defendant, The White Sewing Machine Company, for damages sustained through the alleged defective insulation of a cord
attachment, which, with an electric sewing machine, was sold and
delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff's mother. Upon trial
there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff and a
proceeding in error was brought to reverse .that judgment. (White
Sewing Machine Company v. Feisel. Court of Appeals of Ohio,
1927. 162 N. E. 633.)
The evidence showed that the mother of the plaintiff purchased from the defendant the electric sewing machine .which
was delivered to the home where the plaintiff resided. There
was sold with the machine an insulated cord on one end of which
was. a plug to fit an electric wall socket and on the other a plug
so made that it could be attached to the sewing machine, the purpose being to furnish the electric power necessary to operate the
machine.
On the tenth of September the mother of the plaintiff, after
attaching the cord to the wall socket pulled off the cord where
it was attached to the machine and went to quiet the plaintiff who
was restless, when she picked the plaintiff up the end of the cord
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which fitted the machine fell from plaintiff's mouth. At that
time the rubber cap of the attachment slid down the cord and as a
result the child was badly burned about and inside the mouth. It
was afterwards shown that the threads on the attachment were so
far destroyed as to permit the rubber cap to slide down so as to
expose the bare wires or copper connections for about a half inch.
The court in delivering its opinion confirming that of the
lower court stated the general rule that a manufacturer or seller
is not liable for negligence to third persons with whom he has no
contractual relations (Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co. 120 F.
865) but stated that a machine that employs electricity in it s operation is such a dangerous instrumentality as would require the
manufacturer of such machine to use reasonable inspection of
such parts as are used by it in the construction of the machine,
such as the attachment and cap in this case, even those parts are
purchased from another reputable manufacturer.
The court stated that an electric sewing machine was sold
with the express purpose of being used in a home and with knowledge that there were children of tender years there and the
danger of faulty insulation should have been foreseen. A duty
rested upon the part of the manufacturer towards the members
of the family residing in the home irrespective of contract.
The court further decided, in answering a contention of the
appellants, that at the time of the accident the machine was not
in operation, that although the machine itself was not in operation at the time, the cord attachment was charged with electricity,
and as its only function was to conduct electricity, it was being
used for the purpose intended when it was performing the only
function it could perform.
D. Donahue
COURTS-Here the plaintiff in error was convicted of murder in the first degree and the death sentence imposed. It is
clearly a case of circumstantial evidence. The accused had to
testify through interpreters as he could not speak the English
language. His testimony was interpreted by two young boys
who spoke that Cuban language, the language that the accused
was supposed to speak. The testimony of the defendant, as appears in the record, is not clear and the interpreters after trying to
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interpret the defendants testimony were sworn in as witnesses
and testified that he spoke the Cuban language but this did not
appear to be the fact as the interpreters later testified that there
was no difference between the Spanish and Cuban languages and
that the accused didn't show that he knew anything about the
Spanish language. Therefore by their own testimony it appears
that the interpreters were not capable of understanding the defendant and while the record does not show the extent of the defendants ability to make himself understood in English it appears
that an interpreter was necessary, else the court would not have
called in and attempted to use interpreters.
The failure to administer the proper oath to a witness renders
the witness incompetent. Crockett v. Cassels (Fla.) 116 So. 865.
The subsequent swearing in of the interpreters as witnesses after
the defendant had testified did not operate as a compliance with
the above rule. Also, according to Brown, J. "Under the law a
defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right, if he so desires,
to testify as a witness in his own behalf and in order to make this
right fully effective it is necessary that his testimony be made
fairly intelligible to the jury when it is practically possible to do
so. In this case it is quite clear that the testimony of the defendant was important to his defense, especially in view of the fact
that the conviction was based on circumstantial evidence." In
view of these circumstances as disclosed by the record the case
was remanded for new trial. Kelly v. State 118 So. 1.
Marc WZonderlin
COMMERCE--Shipment of Poultry a Federal Matter Exclusively. This case involves suits brought by the Must Hatch
Incubator Company, Inc., against I. L. Patterson, Governor of the
state of Oregon, and others, and Roland H. Hartley, Governor of
the state of Washington, and others, heard together by stipulation, before the U. S. D. C. Or., Wash. (Must Hatch Incubator
Co. v. Patterson,27 F. (2d) 447).
The plaintiff brings these suits to enjoin and restrain the enforcement of regulations of the states of Washington and Oregon,
prohibiting the shipment into those states of baby chicks unless
accompanied by official healh certificates, the piaintiff alleging
the regulations to be in violation of the commerce.clause of the
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Constitution. The law is settled that a state may, in the exercise
of its police power, legislate to protect its inhabitants, stock or
plants from exposure to disease by prohibiting the introduction
into it of diseasied animals and plants, although interstate- commerce is involved, subject, however, "to the paramount authority
of Congress, if it decides to assume control".
So the question here is whether Congress has "assumed control" of the entire field of transportation of live poultry from one
state to another, in so far as means for the prevention and suppression of contagious and infectious diseases is concerned. By
acts of Congress; 21 USCA 120 et seq. Act Feb. 2, 1903, and 21
USCA 123 et seq. Act March 3, 1905; ana the amendments thereto of Feb. 7, 1928, it seems clear that Congress intended to give
the Secretary of Agrculture supervision of the shipment or transportation of live.poultry, from one state to another, in this regard.
The defendants do not question this authority. But it is suggested that in the absence of any action on the part of the Secretary of Agriculture, there is no invalidity in the state action.
Quoting from the decision in Oregon-Washington Ry. &
Nay. Co. v. Washington, 70 L. Ed. 482, and basing the decision of
the instant case thereon, the court stated, "The obligation to act
without respect to the states is put directly upon the Secretary of
Agriculture whenever quarantine, in his judgment, is necessary.
When he does not act, it must be presumed that it is not neces.sary".
Accordingly a motion to dismiss was denied and interlocutory injunctions were granted.
The case is concise and well-reasoned and appears valuable
for its copious citations in support of all the propositions involved; more valuable in that, though in indirect fashion, it tends
to curb and restrict the ever-lengthening arm of the police power.
At the same time the opinion is a dangerous one and it is
questionable whether or not this is a valid exercise of the administrative power of Congress. The writer believes the .rule to
be that when Congress remains quiescent on a matter within its
jurisdiction, it is within the province of the states to take legislative steps in governing said matter, suich legislation to be valid
and effective until Congress does assume active jurisdiction. In
the opinion Judge Rudkin reasons that Congress has assumed
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control of the matter by virtue of its having, by acts of Congress,
delegated this authority to the Secretary of Agriculture. This
conclusion is dubious. When the Secretary of Agriculture does
not act it is the same, in effect, as thought Congress had not acted
in the matter, and hence, in such instance the state legislation
should be valid. But to bind the states by the discretion or indescretion of the Secretary to act is to confer on an administrative officer a power most inconsistent with the principles of our
government.
Judge Rudkin has the reputation of being a thorugh Federalist and it is possible that herein' lies the force that directs his
decision.
Chas. A. Haskell
LITERARY PROPERTY; EQUITABLE JURISDICTION; INJUNCTION; DAMAGES. This is a suit to restrain
the infringement of a copyright, and to recover damages and profits. In April, 1927, the Atlantic Monthly published an article
by Charles C. Marshall, attacking the candidacy of Governor
Alfred E. Smith, based upon the adherence of the latter to the
Roman Catholic Church. Upon the recommendation of the
editor of the Atlantic Monthly, Governor Smith resolved to meet
publicly these objections in an open letter also intended to be published in said magazine. The letter was sold outright to the
Atlantic Monthly upon the condition that concurrent with its
publication in that magazine, the letter should be given to the
entire press of the country. With full rights to republish it, with
or without giving credit to the magazine, a stipulation which was
agreed to by those representing the Atlantic Monthly.' The
magazine then made public announcement that it would publish
the reply of Gov. Smith to Marshall. The defendant ,the Post
Publishing Co., learning of this, and failing otherwise to secure a
copy of the letter, secured a copy thereof by bribing a watchman
in the employ of the Atlantic Monthly. Having effected this despicable piracy the defendant proceeded to publish the letter on the
16th of April, th6 day before that assigned by the Atlantic
Monthly for the publication of the letter. This is the infringement relied on as the basis of the present suit.
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The court found that the plaintiff, The Atlantic Monthly,
had a valid copyright as to the letter but that this suit must fail
for the reason that the copyright had expired before the commencement of the suit, thus making the issuance of an injunction
out of the question, and leaving no basis for equitable jurisdiction, and hence refusing to award damages. But despite this,
District Judge Morton, proceeded to compute those damages to
which the plaintiff would be entitled in an action at law.
The case offers interest not only because of the national character of the parties involved and the disclosure of the lofty ethical
standards of the American Press, but also in that it traces the
transition from the common law of literary property to our modern copyright laws, their causes and effects. Again is disclosed
the fact that our procedure would merit improvement. A case
is before the court and tried on the merits; a most despicable
piracy is proven beyond a doubt, so much so that the court proceeds to compute and enumerate those damages to which the aggrieved party is entitled; then, because the party approached
court through the portals of equity, he must withdraw, uncompensated, to return to the same tribunal with substantially the
same case clad in the atttire of an action at law. Shades of the
archaic past. (Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F.
(2d) 556).
Chas. A4. Haskell

